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Abstract 
 
We advance the understanding of the philosophy and psychology of curiosity by operationalizing 
and constructing an empirical measure of Nietzsche’s conception of inquisitive curiosity, 
expressed by the German term Wissbegier, (“thirst for knowledge” or “need/impetus to know”) 
and Neugier (“curiosity” or “inquisitiveness”). First, we show that existing empirical measures of 
curiosity do not tap the construct of inquisitive curiosity, though they may tap related constructs 
such as idle curiosity and phenomenological curiosity. Next, we map the concept of inquisitive 
curiosity and connect it to related concepts, such as open-mindedness and intellectual humility. 
The bulk of the paper reports four studies: an Anglophone exploratory factor analysis, an 
Anglophone confirmatory factor analysis, an informant study, and a Germanophone exploratory 
and confirmatory factor analysis.  
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Introduction 
 
Curiosity has been embraced as a virtue in the modern world, where information 
technologies have facilitated the exchange of and search for information on an unprecedented 
scale and where the quest for innovation has become a mantra. As Phillips (2015) and others 
have observed, curiosity is now routinely affirmed in educational institutions and creative 
industries; and it is promoted by advertising campaigns and corporate communications as a 
glossy affirmative feature that is expected from learners and leaders alike. Interestingly, the 
philosophical literature on curiosity is rather sparse: half of the 244 contributions in the 
Philosopher’s Index that pop up when searching for “curiosity” have been published only in the 
last 10 years (search performed in October 2015); and Inan, who recently (2012) wrote a 
monograph on the philosophy of curiosity, observed “that philosophers had simply not taken 
curiosity as a topic that was worthy of philosophical investigation” (Inan 2012, xii-xiii). In 
psychology, a more sustained interest in curiosity can be observed: Although more than one third 
of the 636 contributions that are listed in PsychInfo under the major heading “curiosity” have 
been published in the last 10 years, we find continuous interest in this topic going back to the 
1950s starting with the seminal work or Berlyne (1954) and, besides the current years, another 
peak in interest in the 1970s. However, one has to take into account that within psychology, 
terms like ‘interest’, ‘intrinsic motivation’, ‘play’, and ‘exploration’ have often been used 
interchangeably with ‘curiosity’, yet these terms do not clearly refer to the same construct 
(Kreitler & Kreitler, 1994). In the course of this research, several scales have been proposed to 
measure (facets of) curiosity (for an overview see Reio et al. 2006).  
 
In our contribution, we aim to advance the understanding of the philosophy and 
psychology of curiosity by following in particular Nietzsche’s understanding of curiosity as 
inquisitive curiosity, expressed by the German term Wissbegier, (“thirst for knowledge” or 
“need/impetus to know”) and Neugier (“curiosity” or “inquisitiveness”). This work emerged out 
of a larger project that aims to explore the many facets of intellectual humility. In a semantic 
analysis, we found that one dimension of this construct refers to this Nietzschean understanding 
of curiosity expressed by terms like ‘inquiry’, ‘exploration’ and ‘scrutiny’ (Figure 1; for details 
about how this analysis was performed, see Christen et al. 2014). This result motivated us to 
analyze the curiosity dimension in more detail, because – despite the existence of several 
curiosity scales (Litman & Spielberger 2003; Kashdan et al. 2004; Kashdan et al. 2009) – 
existing measures do not adequately tap the construct of inquisitive curiosity. In this paper, we 
make a contribution to the burgeoning interdisciplinary field of character psychology by building 
and validating a psychological scale of inquisitive curiosity. 
 
In doing so, we follow the best practices in scale construction which have been laid out 
by Leonard Simms (2008) as a three-phase process: 
 
(1) the substantive validity phase, 
(2) the structural validity phase, and 
(3) the external validity phase. 
 
In phase one, experimenters conduct a thorough literature review of the construct to be measured 
and related constructs.  Based on this review, they determine whether a new scale is truly needed, 
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collect definitions of the construct, develop an initial item pool, and conduct expert-review 
studies.  In phase two, the experimenters develop an item selection strategy, collect responses 
from appropriate samples, evaluate the items psychometrically, create provisional scales, and 
modify and add items to address problems.  Finally, in phase three, the experimenters conduct 
studies to evaluate convergent, divergent, discriminant, and criterion-related validity, finalize 
their scale, and report it.   
 
 
Figure 1: Semantic dimensions of intellectual humility, including the “inquisitive self”, which 
served as motivation for developing a scale of inquisitive curiosity (from Christen et al. 2014). 
 
 
 
Here is the plan for this paper: first we review some existing scales of curiosity and 
explain our concerns with them – especially with their face validity. In section 2, we draw on 
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recent work on Nietzschean curiosity to explore the concept of inquisitive curiosity that our new 
scale is meant to measure. The bulk of the paper is section 3, where we review four empirical 
studies of our new scale. We conclude with a brief general discussion. 
 
 
1 Extant curiosity scales 
 
Several curiosity scales have already appeared in the empirical literature. In this section, 
we review a few of the most recent and most representative. The first is Kashdan et al. (2004) – a 
7-item self-report scale with two factors: exploration and absorption.  
 
Exploration items include: 
• I would describe myself as someone who actively seeks as much information as I can in a 
new situation. 
• I frequently find myself looking for new opportunities to grow as a person (e.g., 
information, people, resources). 
• I am not the type of person who probes deeply into new situations or things. [reverse-
scored] 
• Everywhere I go, I am out looking for new things or experiences. 
 
Absorption items include: 
• When I am participating in an activity, I tend to get so involved that I lose track of time. 
• When I am actively interested in something, it takes a great deal to interrupt me. 
• My friends would describe me as someone who is “extremely intense” when in the 
middle of doing something. 
 
We have no doubt that these factors measure interesting and important psychological constructs. 
However, we question the face validity of the absorption factors as a measure of inquisitive 
curiosity. Face validity, as the concept is used in psychology, refers to the degree to which the 
items in a scale or other measure “on their face” seem to match the target construct, so our point 
here is that we think these items may tap an interesting construct, but not inquisitive curiosity. In 
particular, the items in the absorption factor seem to measure the disposition to enter the state 
that Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (2008) calls “flow.” It’s possible for someone to have a flow 
experience even when they are not learning anything new or encountering novel experiences, 
things, or properties. Furthermore, one item in the exploration factor (about growing as a person) 
does not seem to involve curiosity at all, but rather some kind of perfectionist eudaimonism. And 
the remaining three exploration items seem to measure only a specific aspect of curiosity: 
openness to new experiences. They primarily characterize how someone responds when 
encountering novel situations, such as while traveling. One can easily imagine a person who 
scores high on exploration because she enjoys sight-seeing but who has no patience for the 
intensive study of physics, poetry, or cooking. Thus, we think that the Kashdan et al. (2004) 
scale does not quite hit the mark. 
 
The next extant measure of curiosity, Kashdan et al. (2009), is meant to be an 
improvement on Kashdan (2004). This updated scale also has two factors: stretching and 
embracing.  
 5 
 
Stretching items include: 
• I actively seek as much information as I can in new situations. 
• I am at my best when doing something that is complex or challenging. 
• I view challenging situations as an opportunity to grow and learn. 
• I am always looking for experiences that challenge how I think about myself and the 
world. 
• I frequently seek out opportunities to challenge myself and grow as a person. 
 
Embracing items include: 
• I am the type of person who really enjoys the uncertainty of everyday life. 
• Everywhere I go, I am out looking for new things or experiences. 
• I like to do things that are a little frightening. 
• I prefer jobs that are excitingly unpredictable. 
• I am the kind of person who embraces unfamiliar people, events, and places. 
 
Once again, we have no doubt that this scale measures an interesting and important 
psychological construct. However, we continue to have concerns about face validity. The 
embracing factor, in particular, does not seem primarily to measure inquisitive curiosity. It 
includes multiple items that have to do with comfort with uncertainty or even risk. Perhaps it is 
easier to acquire new knowledge or understanding when one is comfortable in this way, but it is 
also possible to experience such comfort without any motivation to learn. This is exemplified by 
what the poet Keats (1899, p. 277) called “negative capability,” a disposition to be “in 
uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason,” which is 
opposed to “being incapable of remaining content with half-knowledge.” 
 
The items in the stretching factor fare somewhat better when assessed for face validity, 
but they too seem to miss the motivated inquisitiveness of curiosity, emphasizing instead 
enjoyment of growing through facing challenges. Not all growth of this sort involves the 
acquisition of knowledge or understanding, however – or the destruction of ignorance or error, 
for that matter. 
 
Finally, consider the epistemic curiosity scale developed by Litman & Spielberger (2003). 
In this paper, the authors first distinguish perceptual curiosity, which has to do with a thirst for 
new phenomenal experiences, from epistemic curiosity, which has to do with a thirst for 
knowledge. They further divide epistemic curiosity into diversive and specific facets. Diversive 
epistemic curiosity drives its bearer to acquire broad but relatively shallow knowledge, while 
specific curiosity drives its bearer to acquire deep knowledge of a narrow domain.  
 
Items measuring the diversive facet include: 
• I enjoy discussing abstract concepts. 
• I find it fascinating to learn new information. 
• I enjoy learning about subjects which are unfamiliar to me. 
• I enjoy exploring new ideas 
• When I learn something new, I like to find out more about it. 
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Items in the specific facet include: 
• When I see an incomplete puzzle, I like to try and imagine the final solution. 
• I am interested in discovering how things work. 
• When I encounter a new kind of arithmetic problem, I enjoy imagining solutions. 
• When I encounter complicated machinery, I like to ask how it works. 
• When I hear a riddle, I am interested in trying to solve it. 
 
These items, especially those associated with the specific facet, fare better on a test of face 
validity for inquisitive curiosity. However, Litman & Spielberger (2003) report significant 
gender differences for this factor, with men scoring significantly higher than women. This is 
presumably because several items in it primarily focus on stereotyped STEM topics (machinery, 
math). We worry that the items measuring this facet are too narrowly focused and may even 
trigger stereotype threat. Additionally, from a psychometric point of view, it is unfortunate that 
all of the items in this scale are positively scored. Acquiescence is a well-known problem in 
personality psychology: basically, people have a tendency to agree with whatever you put in 
front of them. This is one reason why scales with reverse-scored items can be useful. 
 
 
2 Inquisitive curiosity 
 
In order to construct a scale of inquisitive curiosity that isn’t plagued by concerns, it is 
helpful to first consider previous philosophical discussions of curiosity. While traditionally not a 
popular topic of philosophical analysis, two major philosophers have discussed it: Augustine and 
Nietzsche.1 In this section, we explore the concept of inquisitive curiosity with an eye to its 
operationalization based on what we find to be absent in Augustine’s conception of curiosity and 
celebrated in Nietzsche’s.  
 
Though Augustine has nothing but condemnation for curiosity, he discusses two kinds. 
He primarily understands curiosity as a desire “to acquire new experiences,” typically sinful ones, 
such as sex and seeing a “mangled corpse” (Confessions X.35). This sort of phenomenal 
curiosity is an “appetite for knowledge” of what it is like to have certain experiences; it mainly 
aligns with what Berlyne (1954) has called “perceptual curiosity” as the kind of curiosity that 
“leads to increased perception of stimuli” (p. 180). Some of the items on the curiosity scale of 
Kashdan et al. (2009) do seem to be tapping this phenomenal curiosity. However, it appears in 
both factors of stretching and embracing, and several items appear unrelated to curiosity in this 
way. Therefore, the scale provided Kashdan et al. (2009) appears to be only related to, but not 
directly measuring, phenomenal curiosity.  
 
Augustine then briefly notes that phenomenal curiosity can easily lead to another variety. 
“Because of this morbid curiosity, monstrous sights are exhibited in the show places. Because of 
it, men proceed to search out the secrets of nature, things beyond our end, to know which profits 
us nothing, and of which men desire nothing but the knowledge” (Confessions X.35). We can 
call this sort of curiosity idle curiosity. Whether it stems from phenomenal curiosity is 
immaterial, at least for present purposes. They are distinct kinds of curiosity in that have 
                                                
1 A third is Hume, on whom see Gelfert (2013). 
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different motivations and aim at different kinds of knowledge. Idle curiosity can have a variety 
of forms. One might be curious about the latest celebrity gossip, not because one cares who in 
Hollywood is sleeping with whom, but just to know; it achieves nothing independent to know 
this. A desire to conduct scientific research into a natural phenomenon can also be a form of idle 
curiosity, if the scientist is only driven by a desire to know for no other reason than to find the 
answer. She doesn’t care what the answer is. Whatever the answer is, it will neither upset any of 
her other beliefs, nor will it be of any use to her or anyone else. It is merely a puzzle to be solved.  
 
Nietzsche viewed curiosity in a different light. He is arguably the most important 
philosopher of curiosity in the Western tradition. We draw on historical and conceptual work on 
Nietzsche’s conception of curiosity by Mark Alfano (2013) and Bernard Reginster (2013; 2015) 
to explore his notion of inquisitive curiosity. Nietzsche references curiosity (i.e., Neugier, 
Wissbegier, and their cognates) seventy-five times in his published and authorized works (Alfano 
2013). Based on Alfano’s and Reginster’s complementary reconstructions of Nietzsche’s 
conception of curiosity, several points can be made that distinguish it from Augustine’s two 
kinds of curiosity. First, Alfano stresses that Nietzschean curiosity is not merely the desire to 
acquire more true beliefs, contrary to idle curiosity. Both Nietzschean curiosity and idle curiosity 
have the same end goal of acquiring true beliefs. Nietzsche, however, recognized that there is 
value in curiosity even if one fails to attain knowledge. There is something worthwhile in being a 
“seeker after knowledge,” (HH I.630) as Reginster emphasizes. If we seek knowledge but fail, 
we are left in uncertainty. Such a state, however, is not lamentable; curiosity entails a delight in 
the “danger of uncertainty” (GS Preface). Idle curiosity is entirely disappointed when knowledge 
is not obtained. Nietzschean curiosity, on the other hand, still finds value in confronting 
uncertainty through inquiry, which leads us to our second point. 
 
The reason that Nietzschean curiosity “involves an attraction for uncertainty and 
ignorance” (Reginster 2013:456-7) is that it is fundamentally opposed to “faith” understood as 
“the disposition to stop investigating” (Alfano 2013:12). Even if curiosity only produces 
uncertainty, that uncertainty still undermines the dogmatic acceptance of a previously held belief. 
Beliefs that we dogmatically hold are beliefs that we very much want to be true. It matters to us 
whether these beliefs are true. Nietzschean curiosity requires inquiry into these matters. This is 
different from idle curiosity, for which it does not matter to the inquirer one way or the other.  
 
Finally, in contrast with other forms of curiosity, such as those measured by Kashdan et 
al. (2004; 2009), Nietzschean curiosity is highly inquisitive, protracted, and even unpleasant. As 
he puts it, “let [knowledge] be something else for others; for example, a bed to rest on, or the 
way to such a bed, or a diversion, or a form of leisure – for me it is a world of dangers and 
victories in which heroic feelings, too, find places to dance and play. ‘Life as a means to 
knowledge’ – with this principle in one’s heart one can live not only boldly but even gaily” (GS 
324). As Alfano (2013) elaborates, Nietzschean curiosity is “characterized by an insatiable desire 
to solve novel, difficult problems and puzzles, and to discover and invent them when none are 
ready to hand.” It matters both how hard the inquiry is and how important it is. Again the 
contrast with idle curiosity is clear. Nothing is riding on such inquiry and it may or may not be 
easy to undertake.  
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We find Nietzsche a useful precedent for inquisitive curiosity. His conception of the 
construct involves the forceful asking of questions that are difficult to answer (either for purely 
epistemic reasons or because the answers run counter to our squeamishness or faith in humanity). 
In the next section, we describe four studies that we conducted to help build a new scale of 
inquisitive curiosity. We take inquisitive curiosity at least to be consistent with Nietzschean 
curiosity, even if not identical to it. Furthermore, inquisitive curiosity as we have described it fits 
well with contemporary philosophical work on the concept, such as Whitcomb (2010), who 
argues that curiosity is a desire, the contents of which are questions and the satisfier of which is 
knowledge. It also accords with popular cultural insistence on the importance of questioning well, 
in addition to answering well – a distinction hilariously drawn by Douglas Adams in The 
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (1979) when the supercomputer Deep Thought cryptically 
announces, after 7.5 million years of computation, that the answer to the ultimate question 
(which was never made explicit) is 42. 
 
 
3 Four empirical studies of inquisitive curiosity 
 
We conducted four studies to establish the validity and reliability of a new measure of 
inquisitive curiosity: 
 
1) an exploratory factor analysis, 
2) a confirmatory factory analysis, 
3) an “informant” analysis, and 
4) a test of the validity and reliability of a translation of the scale in German. 
 
In the following subsections, we explain these four studies, which were part of a larger project 
that aimed to explore factors of intellectual humility. As the semantic analysis suggested (see 
Introduction), we expected inquisitive curiosity to be one of the dimensions of the construct. 
 
3.1 Curiosity from the inside: An exploratory study 
 
In the first study, we conducted what is known as an exploratory factor analysis. For 
those who are unfamiliar with psychometrics, what this essentially means is that we wrote 
several dozen statements that express 1) the attitude of someone who embodies the target 
construct, 2) the attitude of someone who embodies dispositions contrary to the target construct, 
and 3) the attitudes of someone who embodies related but distinct dispositions. We then invited 
several hundred people to read each of these statements and agree or disagree with them. Next, 
we examined participants’ responses for clustering patterns. A “factor” in the resulting analysis 
is a set of statements that participants tend to respond to in the same way (either mostly agreeing 
or mostly disagreeing).  
 
3.1.1 Participants and Procedure 
 
 Participants were college students at a large Midwestern public university.  We sent an 
invitation email to a random sample of 5000 students, of whom 442 responded. The average age 
of participants was 20.9; about 90% of participants were between the ages 18–22. 30.5% of the 
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sample was male. 85.5% of the sample was White/Caucasian, 4.5% was African-
American/Black, 2.9% was Asian, and 1% was Hispanic. The majority of participants reported 
taking fewer than 2 philosophy classes (83.7%) and fewer than 2 psychology classes (58.8%). 
Only .5% of the participants were psychology majors and there were no philosophy majors in the 
sample. The two most popular majors of participants were Business Administration (9.6%) and 
Religious Studies (8.2%). Average GPA of the sample was 3.29, the average SAT score was 
1346.67, and the average ACT score was 25.44. 
 
3.1.2 Measure 
 
 The original item pool consisted of 52 items, of which about a dozen could be associated 
with curiosity (see appendix A for a complete list of items). Items were informed by a variety of 
sources. Some items were adapted from the items in the HEXACO personality inventory, 
including most subscales of the honesty/humility dimension, as well as the dependence subscale 
of emotionality, the diligence subscale of conscientiousness, and the inquisitiveness and 
unconventionality subscales of openness. Other items were informed by a thorough consideration 
of the defining aspects of Nietzschean curiosity, as well as some of its more penumbral elements.  
These items were developed after conducting a thorough literature review of philosophical and 
psychological research on intellectual virtues. 
A balance of reverse and forward-keyed items were included (27 of the 52 items 
indicated the absence of the intended construct). Participants were asked to rate on a 7-point 
scale their level of agreement with the items, with 1 anchored as “strongly disagree” and 7 
anchored as “strongly agree.” 
 
3.1.3 Results 
 
To determine the factor structure, we used Mplus Version 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012) to 
conduct an exploratory factor analysis using promax rotation. A parallel analysis suggested 7 
factors should be extracted by strict cut-off criteria, but the 8-factor solution was more 
interpretable. Items that had a loading greater than .30 in magnitude on their primary factor were 
retained (see Appendix A for a list of items that met this criterion for each factor). Though 
ideally each item would also have low cross-loadings (< .10) on all factors other than the primary 
factor, only four items satisfied this criterion. However, compared to solutions with fewer factors, 
the average proportion of cross-loadings > .10 for each item was lowest in the 8-factor solution.  
Upon inspection of the content of each factor, we found that only the first four factors 
were relevant to intellectual humility, the construct we initially set out to measure. A factor with 
content consistent with inquisitive curiosity also clearly emerged as a separate factor from these 
four humility factors. Four items loaded above .3 on the inquisitive curiosity factor, and the 
content of these items aligned with a central aspect of inquisitive curiosity: motivated inquiry 
that perseveres in order to achieve the highest possible level of mastery. The items loading on 
this factor include “I try to learn as much as I can” and “I often push myself very hard when 
trying to master a new idea.” This kind of curiosity is quite different from possessing a 
disposition to be comfortable with new ideas, as the Kashdan scales define curiosity. The present 
definition of curiosity assumes no such comfort, and in fact, the motivation to achieve mastery 
implies quite the opposite, as truly mastering an idea characteristically brings with it uncertainty 
and difficulty. We think the inquisitive curiosity measure better reflects the virtue of curiosity in 
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the Nietzschean sense than previous measures, as in order to endorse these items, a person has to 
approach learning with a great degree of tenacity.  
 
Though inquisitive curiosity clearly emerged as a distinct factor from the other four 
intellectual humility factors, it was related to the intellectual humility factors. Below are the four 
intellectual humility factors listed in order of the strength of their scale scores’ correlation with 
the scale score for inquisitive curiosity, with brief descriptions of the content of each. 
 
Open-mindedness (r=.44 with curiosity): The tendency to acknowledge the limitations of 
one’s knowledge irrespective of one’s status, and relatedly, to be open to learning from 
those of lower status. 
Engagement (r=.38 with curiosity): The motivation to understand ideas one disagrees with or 
ideas that come from diverse sources. 
Corrigibility (r=.2 with curiosity): A lack of defensiveness in reaction to being told one has 
made an intellectual mistake. 
Modesty (r=.11 with curiosity): The tendency not to be highly preoccupied with one’s 
intellectual reputation.  
 
Three other factors also emerged which were conceptually peripheral to both intellectual 
humility and curiosity (these were uniqueness, which was composed of three items about feeling 
special when one has knowledge; intellectual machiavellianism, which was composed of four 
items about manipulating others in order to get more information, and intellectual kleptomania, 
which was composed of three items about stealing others’ ideas).  
 
3.2 Curiosity from the inside: A confirmatory study 
 
In the second study, we conducted what is known as a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA). The basic idea behind a confirmatory factor analysis is to double-check the structure or 
pattern that emerged in an exploratory analysis (something, we note, which was not done by 
Litman & Spielberger 2003). As philosophers of science have long been aware, it is remarkably 
easy to over-fit a model to a data-set. Confirmatory factor analysis checks the degree to which 
the best-fitting model from the exploratory analysis fits the data generated by a fresh set of 
participants. 
 
3.2.1 Participants and Procedure 
 
Participants (N = 465; Mage = 33.29, 240 female) were recruited and compensated 
using Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk platform. Ages ranged from 18–82, and median 
education completed was an Associates degree; 41.9% had a Bachelors or higher level of 
education. 53.2% had taken at least one philosophy class; 69.4% had taken at least one 
psychology class. The median number of philosophy classes taken was 1, and the median 
number of psychology classes was also 1. Seventy-five percent of participants were 
White/Caucasian, 8.6% were African-American or Black, 7.7% were Asian, 5.8% were Hispanic, 
0.4% were Pacific Islander, and 1.9% were Multiracial. 
 
3.2.2 Measure 
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The measure was identical to the one used in study 1. Participants responded to 52 items 
presented in random order. Participants rated their agreement on a 7-point Likert-type scale.  
 
3.2.3 Results: Confirmatory factor analysis 
 
To determine the extent to which the 8-factor structure replicated in a second sample, we 
conducted a CFA using Maximum Likelihood estimation with robust standard errors.2 In the 
CFA we included all items that loaded above .3 on their factors in study 1. The CFA had 
marginal fit: χ2(1052) = 2400.97, CFI = .826, RMSEA = .053, SRMR = .075. Inspection of the 
modification indices in Mplus showed that a few items had a tendency to cross-load on multiple 
factors, and were clear candidates for removal. This led us to drop items 14 and 16 from the 
modesty factor, and 39 and 41 from the open-mindedness factor. Dropping these items resulted 
in a model with better fit, χ2(874) = 1742.62, CFI = .874, RMSEA = .046, SRMR = .061.  
 
Factor loadings on the curiosity factor were fairly consistent in this model, ranging from 
a magnitude of .6 to .72, suggesting that each item related to the curiosity factor to a similar 
degree (no item was notably more characteristic of the curiosity factor than another). The 
curiosity factor showed a similar pattern of relationships to the intellectual humility factors as in 
the first study: the factor correlation between engagement and curiosity was the highest (r =.733), 
followed by the correlation between open-mindedness and curiosity (r = .691), followed by the 
correlation between curiosity and corrigibility (r =.517). Unlike in the first study, modesty and 
curiosity showed no relation at all (r = .004). Of the additional three factors that emerged in the 
eight-factor solution that were more peripheral to intellectual humility (machiavellianism, 
kleptomania, and uniqueness), only machiavellianism and kleptomania showed a relation with 
curiosity (r = -.214, r = -.498, respectively).  
 
The fact that curiosity shows strong relationships with three other components of our 
intellectual humility scale suggest that it may be worth considering how open-mindedness, 
engagement, and corrigibility relate to inquisitive curiosity.  
 
3.2.4 Results: Item response theory analysis 
 
In order to further investigate the psychometrics of this new measure, we supplemented 
the confirmatory factor analysis with analyses from the perspective of item response theory 
(IRT). IRT is a model-based framework used for investigating item and test properties; it 
assumes a latent trait or ability that is a function of both the participant’s responses, and the 
properties of the items (Emberton & Reise, 2000). Thus, IRT allows us to simultaneously 
estimate an individual’s trait level and also the relevant item parameters. This is distinctly 
different from the classical approach. 
 
The goal of this further examination was two-fold. First, we aimed to identify the 
characteristics of individual items; and second, we wanted to estimate the overall reliability of 
                                                
2 Exploratory data analysis revealed the assumption of multivariate normality had been violated 
(Mardia’s coefficient = 69.82). 
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the measure in a manner distinct from the classical testing theory approach. In order to 
investigate the individual properties of items, we used a graded response model (Samejima, 1969, 
1996) implemented in the ltm package (Rizopoulos, 2006) in the R statistical language (R Core 
Team, 2013).  
 
Of particular interest were item slopes (a) and threshold parameters (bj). Item slopes 
describe an item’s ability to differentiate between participants having levels of the latent trait 
above or below the item’s location (Baker, 2001). Item slopes are frequently referred to as 
discrimination parameters. Threshold parameters can be considered cut points on the latent trait’s 
continuum where a participant with that level of the latent trait is equally likely to select the 
response category j rather than category j + 1. In the testing literature, threshold parameters are 
referred to as difficulty parameters. This is because, historically, the first area in which this sort 
of psychometric analysis was used was intelligence testing. Harder questions on an intelligence 
test have a higher difficulty parameter. Similarly, items that are more difficult to endorse tend to 
have higher threshold parameters. 
 
Table 1 below illustrates the parameter estimates from the fitted response model of the 
curiosity items. Several features are important to note. First, the threshold parameter estimates 
are distributed more towards the negative end of the latent continuum. This relates to the amount 
of measurement precision these items provide on the negative end of the latent continuum; we 
revisit this below. Second, the standard error estimates are all rather small even at the extremes 
of the response scale. This suggests participants made use of the entirety of the response 
categories, which is encouraging. Finally, we note that the slope parameters are quite similar 
across the various items. This is also encouraging in that it supports the use of simple un-
weighted sum scoring to compute the scale (Cheng, Yuan, & Lui, 2012). 
 
 
Table 1. IH-Curiosity item parameter estimates. 
Item b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 a 
19 -3.18 (0.33) -2.69 (0.45) -2.33 (0.43) -1.71 (0.39) -0.93 (0.34) 0.64 (0.29) 2.33 (0.26) 
20 -3.76 (0.52) -2.51 (0.56) -1.83 (0.53) -1.32 (0.51) -0.32 (0.49) 1.2 (0.64) 2.23 (0.23) 
21 -3.91 (0.48) -2.21 (0.46) -1.2 (0.41) -0.66 (0.39) 0.11 (0.38) 1.52 (0.66) 1.56 (0.16) 
22 -4.05 (0.61) -2.41 (0.61) -1.71 (0.58) -1.25 (0.57) -0.55 (0.55) 0.68 (0.54) 1.92 (0.2) 
Note: b indicates a threshold parameter, a indicates slope, SE estimates are in parantheses. 
 
We next examined the item information curves for each of the curiosity items (see Figure 2 
below). This gives a visual display of the level of measurement precision (known as information) 
each item provides, across all levels of the latent trait (θ). Similarly, the test information curve 
(see Figure 3 below) sums the individual item information curves to give an indication of the 
measurement precision of the entire scale across all levels of θ. As can be seen in Figure 3, the 
curiosity scale provides the greatest amount of information toward the negative end of the latent 
continuum, and as Figure 2 suggests, this pattern seems to hold for each of the individual items 
as well. Item 21 appears to provide the least amount of information overall, but provides slightly 
more information than the other items on the upper end of the latent continuum. Overall, though, 
these results suggest the items in the scale behave similarly. The curiosity scale is most adept at 
discriminating between people with low to moderate levels of curiosity; it may not be as adept at 
discriminating between people with moderate to high levels of curiosity.  
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Figure 2. Item information curves for Curiosity items. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Test information function for the Curiosity scale. 
 
3.3 Curiosity from the outside 
 
Inquisitive curiosity isn’t just a matter of what you think about yourself. Like any 
character trait, inquisitive curiosity is a disposition to think, feel, and act. Since the characteristic 
manifestation of this disposition is protracted inquiry, it would be surprising if someone who 
embodied inquisitive curiosity were not seen as such by those who know her well. Of course, it 
is possible to conduct one’s inquiries in secret or in such a way that other people are simply 
 14 
baffled by one’s behavior. Nevertheless, even Nietzsche would say that the people who know 
you best are typically in a decent epistemic position to evaluate your character. Indeed, if Alfano 
(2015a, 2015b, 2016) is right, Nietzsche held that the character one publically projects and the 
character that is attributed to one may causally or even constitutively determine the character one 
actually has. 
 
For these reasons, we conducted an “informant” study of inquisitive curiosity. Informant 
studies have become popular in personality psychology (John & Robins 1993; Kenny & West 
1994; Klonsky et al. 2002; Connolly et al. 2007; Vazire & Carlson 2010) in part because they 
lend external verification to self-report measures of dispositions. I might think that I’m the life of 
the party, but if everyone I know sees me as a wallflower, I’m probably wrong. Of course, 
intersubjective agreement isn’t infallible. I and my friends might all think that I’m uproariously 
funny despite my being a charmless bore. That said, informant reports shed some evidential light 
on people’s dispositions.  
 
In this study, we replicated the confirmatory analysis of study 2, then asked participants 
to nominate several “informants” who knew them well. We then invited the nominees to rate the 
original participants on the same statements, transformed into third-personal attributions rather 
than first-personal expressions of attitudes. For instance, “I try to learn as much as I can,” 
became, “(S)he tries to learn as much as (s)he can.” We then compared the pattern of responses 
by participants with the patterns of responses by their informants. 
 
3.3.1 Participants and Procedure 
 
Two groups of participants were recruited for this study.  The first, self-report group of 
participants (N = 1185; Mage = 33.6, 56% female) were recruited and compensated using 
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk platform. Ages ranged from 18-79, and median education 
completed was an associate’s degree (2-year); 43.5% had a Bachelors or higher level of 
education. 56.4% had taken at least one philosophy class; 71.2% had taken at least one 
psychology class. The median number of philosophy classes taken was 1, and the median 
number of psychology classes was also 1. 71.2% percent of participants were White/Caucasian, 
13% were African-American or Black, 5.4% were Asian, 5.1% were Hispanic, .4% were Pacific 
Islander, and 1.8% were Multiracial.   
 
The second, informant group of (N = 107; Mage = 36.12 years, 58% female) were 
recruited by emailing up to five informants per self-report participant. Informants’ given names 
and email addresses were provided by participants.3 We then emailed all potential informants 
inviting them to tell us about the participant and offering as compensation a $5 online gift card to 
Target. Of the 1402 informants contacted, N=107 completed the survey, giving us informant 
ratings on 89 of our main participants (74 of our main participants had one informant, 14 had two 
informants, and one had five informants). Ages of the informants ranged from 16-65, 70.1% 
                                                
3 We should note that some participants objected to being asked for such potentially-identifying 
information. Future informant-report studies on Mechanical Turk should take this privacy 
concern into account. 
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percent of informant participants were White/Caucasian, 6.5% were African-American or Black, 
1.9% were Asian, 8.4% were Hispanic, .9% were Pacific Islander, and 3.7% were Multiracial.  
 
3.3.2 Measure 
 
Two distinct measures were used. For the self-report group, the measure was identical to 
the one used in studies 1 and 2 with six new items added as potential replacements for items that 
performed less well in the intellectual humility scales. Participants rated their agreement with 
these 58 items on a 7-point Likert-type scale. 
 
For the informant group, the measure was identical to the one just described for the self-
report group, with one obvious but important exception: instead of asking participants to agree or 
disagree with statements about themselves (“I am….”), we asked them to agree with the same 
statements about the person who referred them to us (“s/he is….”).  We also included items 
meant to gauge how well the informants knew the participants: 
 
How do you know XX? 
How long have you known XX? 
How well do you know XX? 
How close are you to XX? 
 
Responses to these questions might, we presumed, help us to subdivide our informants into the 
more and the less informed. 
 
3.3.3 Results: Agreement between Informant and Self-Ratings 
 
 Our informants appeared to be fairly well-informed: on average, informants reported 
knowing the main participant 14.18 years, and 90.7% of informants reported that they knew the 
participant “quite well” or “about as well as anybody does.” The highest proportion of 
informants were friends of the main participant (44.9%) followed by family members (19.6%) 
and romantic partners (17.8%), and the lowest proportion were colleagues (10.3%). 
 
To check for agreement between informant-ratings and self-ratings of inquisitive 
curiosity, we averaged the informants’ responses on each item for main participants who had 
more than one informant, and then checked how highly the self-report scale scores correlated 
with those of the scales composed by the aggregated informants’ responses. The Curiosity scale 
showed a modest level of agreement (r=.359) that was comparable to the other intellectual 
humility scales. The Modesty scale showed the highest level of agreement between self- and 
informant-reports (r= .472), which is perhaps not surprising, given that the Modesty items 
capture a preoccupation with how one is perceived by others, e.g. “I like to be the smartest 
person in the room.” The Open-mindedness scale had a similar level of self-informant agreement 
(r=.338) as Curiosity. Corrigibility and Engagement had the lowest levels of agreement (r=.285 
and r=.283, respectively). 
 
Since there have been no other informant studies of curiosity scales in the literature, we 
cannot evaluate whether this level of agreement is typical for a construct like curiosity. However, 
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according to three meta-analyses, the average agreement for personality traits is somewhere in 
the range .40-.60 (Connolly et al., 2007; Kenny, 1994; Klonsky et al., 2002; as described in 
Vazire & Carlson, 2010). Self-other agreement tends to be lower for more evaluative personality 
traits, such as intellect and conscientiousness, and higher for traits that are constituted by more 
observable behaviors, such as extraversion (John & Robins, 1993). For a construct like Curiosity, 
we might expect that only informants who know the main participant enough to comment on the 
participant’s most important motivations and goals would be knowledgeable enough to generate 
a high degree of consensus. 
 
 Among the informant ratings, the correlations between the curiosity scale and other 
intellectual humility scales showed a similar pattern as in the second study; curiosity was most 
strongly related to open-mindedness (r=.643), followed by engagement (r=.520) and corrigibility 
(r=.461). Also similar to the previous studies, the correlation between modesty and curiosity was 
not significantly different from zero. The correlations between scales composed of the same 
people rating themselves were very similar to the correlations between informant-ratings.  It is 
worth noting that similar relationships between curiosity, open-mindedness, and engagement 
have been observed across different samples and with the addition of this study, across different 
methods (in both self-ratings and informant-ratings). This suggests that the relationship between 
curiosity and the other intellectual humility scales is more than just a method artifact, and 
deserves further attention. 
 
 
3.4 Curiosity and Neugier 
 
Nietzsche wrote in German. Concerns about the indeterminacy of translation 
notwithstanding (Quine, 1960, chapter 2; Davidson 1984, p. 62), it stands to reason that a 
measure of inquisitive curiosity in English should translate well to a measure of inquisitive 
Neugier in German. Furthermore, we are interested in potential cultural differences regarding the 
understanding of inquisitive curiosity. The first successful psycholexical replication of the Big 
Five model outside of English was in German (Ostendorf 1990). This suggests that our 
methodology is especially likely to replicate in German, though we hope eventually to study 
other languages, including non-Germanic and even non-Indo-European languages. To establish 
this, we translated our entire set of statements into German, then conducted both an exploratory 
and a confirmatory factor analysis, thereby replicating both study 1 and study 2 in a different 
language. 
 
3.4.1 Participants and Procedure 
 
We used the participant recruitment system of the University of Zurich that allows 
approaching students and staff of all faculties. In total, 579 participants provided valid answers. 
The average age of participants was 34.5; 38.7% of the sample was male. The distribution across 
faculties was as follows: philosophy 4.5%, psychology 12.1%, other humanities discipline 24.4%, 
social sciences 13.0%, sciences 18.1%, law 9.5%, medicine 12.8%, other 5.7%. 39.0% of the 
sample had a master’s degree, 31.1% had a PhD. We used a random sub-sample of 279 
participants for exploratory and the remaining 300 participants for confirmatory factor analysis. 
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3.4.2 Measure 
 
The goal of the German-language study was to precisely replicate the procedure used in 
the English study. This approach should allow better identification of cultural differences 
regarding the understanding of intellectual humility, such as differences in the composition of the 
factors, in particular inquisitive curiosity. Therefore, we refrained from simply translating the 
final items of the English scale. Instead, all 52 items of the original English scale were translated 
by one author (M.C.) and the translations were checked independently by two experts who were 
not involved in the study (one social psychologist and one English teacher in a technical 
university). When comparing the German with the English result, we checked for “configural 
invariance,” which obtains when the translation has the same factor structure as the original 
(though not necessarily the same means, variance, etc.). 
 
 
3.4.3 Results 
 
We used the same methodology for determining the factor structure as outlined in studies 
1 and 2. In the exploratory factor analysis, parallel analysis suggests that the number of factors 
equals 10 and the number of components equals 7. Given this situation and to enable a 
comparison with the result of the English study, we used the 8-factor solution, as this was also 
more interpretable. As in the English study, we retained items with a factor load greater than .30 
in magnitude on their primary factor. Then, items that cross-loaded on more than one factor with 
weight >.30 were deleted. The result is outlined and compared with the result of the English EFA 
in Table 2; the item numbers match with the translations. We find that three factors show a 
complete match (machiavellianism, kleptomania, corrigibility) and two factors show an item-
overlap of 50% and more (engagement and curiosity). Interestingly, the factor Neugier was 
broader in German compared to the English “Curiosity”. Three other factors are semantically 
rather distinct. Considerably more items have been excluded in the German study compared to 
the English study using the same exclusion criteria. We then performed the CFA analogous to 
the English study, leading to the final scale of inquisitive curiosity. 
 
When comparing both scales (Table 2), we find that the German scale includes a facet not 
present in the English scale, namely some degree of openness and self-understanding, expressed 
by the items “I enjoy reading about the ideas of different cultures” and “I have a good 
understanding of what I know and what I don’t know.” 
 
English Curiosity Scale Items German Curiosity Scale Items 
 
I try to learn as much as I can. 
 
I often push myself very hard when trying to 
master a new idea. 
 
Often when I’m in the process of learning 
something, I end up quitting without having 
really mastered it [reverse scored]. 
 
Ich versuche so viel wie möglich zu lernen. 
 
Ich strenge mich oft sehr an, wenn ich eine 
neue Idee verstehen will. 
 
Wenn ich daran bin, etwas zu lernen, ist es 
häufig so, dass ich aufgebe, bevor ich es 
wirklich verstanden habe [reverse scored]. 
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I learn only the minimum amount needed to 
get by [reverse scored]. 
 
 
Ich lerne nur das Minimum, um gerade noch 
durchzukommen [reverse scored]. 
 
Ich lese gerne über Ideen anderer Kulturen. 
 
Ich kann gut einschätzen, was ich weiss und 
was ich nicht weiss. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of English and German items for curiosity and Neugier scales. 
 
The latter item indicates a meta-cognitive awareness of one’s own strengths and limitations – a 
feature which, in recent philosophical work, has been connected with open-mindedness (Adler 
2004) and intellectual humility (Hazlett 2012; Whitcomb et al. forthcoming). This once gain 
suggests that inquisitive curiosity – at least as it is understood in German-speaking Switzerland – 
is deeply related to other intellectual virtues. 
 
 
4 General discussion 
 
In The Gay Science 2, Nietzsche remarks: 
 
But to stand in the midst of this rerum concordia discors and the whole marvelous 
uncertainty and ambiguity of existence without questioning, without trembling 
with the craving and rapture of questioning, without at least hating the person who 
questions, perhaps even being faintly amused by him – that is what I feel to be 
contemptible, and this is the feeling I look for first in anyone. Some folly keeps 
persuading me that every person has this feeling, simply as human. 
 
In this chapter, we have shown how to measure the extent to which every person does in fact 
have this feeling, this drive to ask questions in order to achieve knowledge.  
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Appendix A. Complete List of Items in English, organized by scale 
 
Items marked with (-) are reverse-scored. 
 
 
Curiosity scale 
19 I try to learn as much as I can. 
20 I often push myself very hard when trying to master a new idea. 
21 (-) Often when I’m in the process of learning something, I end up quitting without having 
really mastered it. 
22 (-) I learn only the minimum amount needed to get by. 
 
Intellectual humility scale 
Open-mindedness items 
17 Whenever I don’t understand something, I want to ask another person for guidance. 
23 When someone disagrees with me, I try to find out why.  
27 (-) I think that paying attention to people who disagree with me is a waste of time. 
28 I like talking to people with different viewpoints than mine. 
33 (-) When a person disagrees with me, I usually assume there is something wrong with that 
person. 
34 I feel no shame learning from someone who knows more than me. 
35 If I do not know much about some topic, I don’t mind being taught about it, even if I know a 
lot about other topics. 
36 Teachers can learn a lot from their students. 
41 I would never brag about how much I know. 
45 Even when I have high status, I don’t mind learning from others who have lower status. 
50 (-) Only wimps admit that they’ve made mistakes. 
51 (-) I don’t take people seriously if they’re very different from me 
52 (-) People from other countries have weird ideas. 
Intellectual Modesty items 
8 Being smarter than other people is not especially important to me. 
9 (-) I would like to have more access to information than everyone else. 
10 (-) I would like to be seen explaining ideas that no one else understands. 
11 (-) I would get a lot of pleasure from knowing more than other people. 
12 I don’t feel that I know or understand more than most other people. 
13 I wouldn’t want people to treat me as though I were intellectually superior to them.  
14 (-) I think I am entitled to more intellectual respect than the average person is.  
15 (-) I want people to know that I am an unusually intelligent person.  
16 (-) I can solve difficult puzzles without needing intellectual support from anyone else. 
32 (-) I like to be the smartest person in the room. 
Corrigibility items 
37 (-) I find it annoying to be told that I’ve made an intellectual mistake. 
38 (-) If someone points out an intellectual mistake that I’ve made, I tend to get angry. 
39 I appreciate being corrected when I make a mistake. 
40 When someone corrects a mistake that I’ve made, I do not feel embarrassed.  
Engagement items 
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18 (-) I rarely discuss things that I wish I understood better with other people. 
24 I enjoy reading about the ideas of different cultures. 
25 (-) I would be very bored by a book about ideas I disagreed with. 
26 (-) I’ve never really enjoyed figuring out why people disagree with me. 
29 (-) I find it boring to discuss things I don’t already understand. 
31 (-) A disagreement is like a war.  
 
Uniqueness items 
42 (-) I don’t feel special when I realize that I know a lot. 
44 (-) If I know a lot about some topic, I don’t feel special about it. 
46 (-) I don’t feel special when I realize that I know more than other people. 
 
 
Machiavellianism items 
1 If I want someone I dislike to tell me what I want to know, I will act very nicely toward that 
person in order to get the information. 
2 (-) I wouldn’t use flattery to get information from someone, even if I thought it would 
succeed. 
3 If I want information from someone, I will laugh at that person’s worst jokes. 
4 (-) I wouldn’t pretend to like someone just to get that person to tell me what I want to know. 
 
 
Kleptomania items 
5 If I knew I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal someone else’s ideas. 
6 I would be tempted to steal someone else’s ideas if I didn’t have the time or interest to come 
up with my own ideas. 
7 I’d be tempted to copy someone else’s work, if I were sure I could get away with it. 
 
Items not loading above .3 on any factor: 
30 I would rather be convincing but wrong than unconvincing but right. 
47 I have a good understanding of what I know and what I don’t know. 
48 Being prejudiced against someone in a discussion is not a big problem. 
49 When arguing with someone, tend to exaggerate how much I know. 
 
 
